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I am pleased to see that Bekoff and Jamieson (B&J)
and I are in substantial agreement on many of the
issues raised in volume I of their recent book and in
my review of it. In particular, I agree with them on
the following:
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Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
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1. Recognition of moral kinship with nonhuman
animals is likely to follow recognition of
"behavioral and emotional kinship."

Singer, P. (1990). Animal Liberation, second edition. New
York: New York Review of Books.

2. Cognitive ethology can provide an "epistemic
infrastructure" necessary for the philosophical
argument for and the public acceptance of that
kinship. We should add that the emerging subfield
of "animal studies" also can make an important
contribution to that necessary empirical base. This
enterprise, which provides social scientific
studies of the ways in which nonhuman animals
figure in our lives, already has given rise to
academic programs and journals (Anthrowos and
the forthcoming Society and Animals).

Skinner, B. F. (1971). Beyond Freedom and Dignity. New
York: Alfred A. Knopf.
Wuensch, K., G. Poteat, and L. Jernigan (1991 ). "Support for
Animal Rights and Perceived Similarity between Humans
and Other Animals." Paper presented at the annual meeting
of The Animal Behavior Society.
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3. Cognitivism is responsible for some recent gains
in the re-minding of nonhuman animals, a
necessary move in the recognition of kinship.
And, in particular, I believe B&J agree with me on
the following:
1. Cognitive ethology bas residual problems
notably, an adherence to methodological
behaviorism, which, at times, revisits the
limitations of its predecessor, behaviorism proper,
and an over-reliance on the metaphor of the
computer, which metaphor fails "to make room
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for subjectivity" or, as I might put it, remains
experientially thin.
2. Partly offsetting this is the increasingly frequent
use of language which attributes intention and
purpose to nonhuman animals.
3. However, for most investigators this intentionalist
discourse is largely limited to a heuristic device
and is not accompanied by a commitment to the
fact of nonhuman animal minds and experience.
B&J agree on my formulation of a dilemma for
cognitive ethology but disagree on the prospects for
and form of its resolution. As B&J rightly suggest, my
account is purposely provocative, particularly on this
issue of prognosis. I cannot predict the future and have
given up trying since I bet on Carter in 1980. Frankly,
prognostication is for me now a thinly veiled attempt
at influencing, not predicting, the future.
In that vein, I suggested that cognitive ethology will
crystalize into a reductive physiological discourse on
the one side and an interpretive science on the other.
B&J mistook me to imply that the latter is for me a
negative outcome. It is not. I simply "predicted" that
biology or psychology or the emerging conglomerate
field of cognitive science (computer science, cognitive
psychology, linguistics, neuroscience and philosophy)
will refuse to give it scientific standing.
ln fact, I think B&J might agree with me that an
interpretive science, one that complements traditional
natural scientific methods with a broad range of
qualitative, ethnographic, phenomenological and
historical forms of inquiry, could provide the revised
"conception of science" to which they optimistically
refer. For an interpretive science emphasizes under
standing and deemphasizes positivistic preoccupations
with method and validity. Understanding refers to the
harmony between the experience of those individuals
being studied and our explication of that experience.
Having "re-minded" them, an interpretive science of
nonhuman animals would also give them back their
experience, both of their own marvelous worlds and of
the suffering to which they are prone.
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